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INTRODUCTION
Agriculture is perceived as a very risky occupation.  Whenever weather plays a role in the 
production of a commodity, the uncertainty increases.  As Goodwin and Smith observed, 
agricultural production is subject to unpredictable, random shocks caused by weather events, pest 
damages and other natural disasters.  The randomness of supply as well as the inelasticity of 
demand creates peril for farmers.  Historically, policy makers have justified a wide range of 
government programs directed towards the support and stabilization of agricultural prices and 
incomes.  In 1938, legislative efforts to provide protection against crop losses from multiple risks 
resulted in the establishment of a federal crop insurance program through the Crop Insurance 
Act.  The program was discontinued briefly between 1943 and 1945, but has generally 
maintained many of its original features for approximately forty years.  The Federal Crop 
Insurance Act of 1980 expanded the crop insurance program by offering several premium 
subsidies to producers to encourage participation.   
The major objective of the Federal Crop Insurance program is to create an actuarially 
sound, subsidized insurance that will eliminate the need for other disaster assistance.  Attainment 
of this goal had been questioned by Williams et al. who observed: “ Although the 1980 act 
expanded the scope of crop insurance and made it more available, Congress continued to provide 
disaster assistance to farmers via emergency loans and direct payments because the number of 
acres covered by crop insurance remained below the 50% goal established for the program in 
1980…As a likely result of adverse selection and rigid premiums, indemnities paid to farmers in 
each year from 1980-88 exceeded premiums collected.  The loss ratio from 1981 to 1988 was 
1.56 and exceeded Congress’s mandate of 1.0.”  A loss ratio (indemnity/premium) of 1.56 means 
that indemnities paid out exceed premiums collected by 56%.  Goodwin (1993) reported an 
average participation elasticity of –0.32 and an aggregate demand elasticity of –0.73.  He devised 
an interaction term between premium rate and a loss-risk variable (constructed as the average of 
the county’s ten-year loss ratio divided by the state average loss ratio for the year) to examine 
whether premium response was conditional on a farmers’ risk level.  The resulting elasticity 
suggested that counties with low risks have more elastic demand responses than counties with 
high risk.  The importance of this result, as suggested by Goodwin, is that raising the premium 
rates for all producers would result in cancellations by low-risk producers thereby increasing the 
industry loss ratios by even more.  Thus, Goodwin’s results do not support the use of secular 
premium rate increases as a solution to the problem of high program loss ratios.
Adverse selection and moral hazard are considered to be the primary factors in the high 
crop insurance loss ratios.  Moral hazard occurs not only in the crop-insurance, but in general 
insurance markets too.  Primarily, two factors cause moral hazard.  As Knight and Coble 
observed, “ 1) Insureds must take less care to prevent losses than they would if uninsured, thus 
increasing there expected losses or indemnities.  2) Insurers must be unable to observe and 
incorporate the insureds’ reduced care into their premiums, such that premiums are inadequate to 
cover expected indemnities plus administrative costs.”  Miranda has argued that adverse 
selection is the primary cause of actuarial unsoundness (loss ratio > 1.0) in the crop insurance 
programs.  Adverse selection arises if producers are better able to ascertain their likelihood of 
suffering losses than are insurers.  Skees and Reed and Goodwin have examined the potential for 
adverse selection created through possible misclassification of producer riskiness based on 
historical mean yields for the insured unit. Skees and Reed also examined the appropriateness of 
equal premiums for farms with different mean yields.  Their results support the FCIC practice of 
charging lower rates to farms with higher mean yields.  Goodwin investigating along the same 
lines found that rate-setting practices with only average yield considerations would introduce 
adverse selection into the pool of insureds.
Knight and Coble (1999) examined a second potential cause of adverse selection relating 
to a controversial crop insurance contract provision which allows farms to be optionally 
subdivided into separate insured units based on production parameters.  Insured units are divided 
into two types: basic and optional.  A basic unit is all of a farmer’s acreage of a crop, owned or 
leased.  A landlord who leases out his land to different farmers owns different basic units. 
Optional units are sub-divided basic units.  Location and crop production practices define these.  
Different farming practices, like dryland versus irrigated production also define different 
optional units too.  
This paper examines the appropriateness and adequacy of several adjustments that are 
incorporated into crop insurance rates to correct for the heterogeneity of risks among insureds.  
Specifically, the factors are optional subdivision, farming practice (irrigated or dryland), mean 
yield, reported acres, coverage level, and penalties imposed for having less than a required 
amount of historical yields for establishment of the insured yield.  The plan of the paper is as 
follows.  First I outline the aspects of Federal Actual Production History Program (APHP) 
premium rate structure.  Next I explain the data and estimation procedures.  This is followed by 
results of the analysis.  Finally, suggestions for improvement are offered.  
PREMIUM RATE STRUCTURE OF APHP
The APHP contract is tailored to reflect differences in riskiness across counties and 
among individual insureds within a county.  Driscoll (1988, pp. 28-30) observed that there are 
three approaches to ratemaking.  There are the pure premium approach, loss ratio approach and 
judgement.  The basic ratemaking procedure used by the FCIC is an empirical application of the 
pure premium approach, which is similar to the experience rating suggested by Driscoll, but with 
several added adjustments that are based on analysis of underlying relationships for different 
crops and geographical location.  Milliman & Robertson (M&R) have said, “ For long term 
efficiency, it is imperative that the procedure for determining rates be responsive to changing 
conditions and distribute costs equitably among producers.  Failure to do so will result in rates 
not representative of current conditions and less than optimal levels of participation of low cost 
producers.” 
Millman & Robertson identify three general steps in a producer’s rate calculation.
They were
1) Compilation of experience data.
2) Development of county rates
3) Calculation of producers rates.
The producer data for the most recent twenty years are compiled at the county level.  These 
include acres insured, acres indemnified, liability, premium, indemnity, number of policies 
indemnified, number of units indemnified and average coverage levels.  Producers whose loss 
experience exceeds certain criteria are segregated into a separate high-risk pool.  The remaining 
data are summarized at the county level and the liability, premium and indemnity data are 
adjusted to a common coverage level.
Milliman & Robertson explain the calculation of coverage levels to a common ground.  The 
county level experience is based on a number of producers with different coverage levels.  To 
achieve an appropriate balance of responsiveness and stability in the rates, it is necessary to 
consider both the lengths of the experience period and the weighing assigned to the individual 
years in the experience period.  They recommended that the FCIC practice of equally weighing 
the most recent twenty years of experience be retained.  They continue by explaining a formula 
to convert indemnity at a given coverage level for a county to the 65% coverage level
It is as follows
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Ains = Acres insured
Milliman & Robertson explain the development of county rates from the experience data.  There 
are 3 steps.  First there is the development of target rates.  Target rates are those rates that have 
not yet been adjusted for maximum allowable annual increase or decrease.  The second step is 
the “smoothing” of target rates to reduce differences in the surrounding counties.  The smoothed 
rates are known as “unloaded” rates.  Third is adding of loads in the rate formula.  Loads are 
added for practice type, unit division, disaster reserve and catastrophic losses.
County unloaded rates are calculated using the smoothed county unloaded target rates.  
There is a pre-determined annual maximum percentage increases or decreases specified by 
Congress in comparison to the prior years’ rates.  The rates are loaded for the disaster reserve, 
catastrophe provision, unit division and practice type. To determine a producers’ 65% base 
coverage rate, two rate expansion factors are considered: yield span exponentials and coverage 
level differentials. 
The ratemaking formula is: 
Yield Span ratio is the ratio of the producers’ historical average yield to the county average 
yield.  This can be illustrated with a simple example.  Here, I assume there is no catastrophic 
rate.  If the average yield of a county is 40 bushels, a producer with an expected yield of 30 
would have a yield span ratio of 30/40 = 0.75.  There are nine categories of yield spans based on 
the yield span ratio: mean yields below 0.5 of the county yield, seven evenly spaced yield spans 
between 0.5 and 1.5 of the county yield and yield span 9 for mean yields greater than 150% of 
the county yield.
The exponential takes three alternative values for different crops: -1, -1.2 and –1.5.  With 
no catastrophic load, an exponential of –1.0 results in a constant premium per acre.  If a 
producer’s expected yield is one-half the county average expected yield, the producer’s yield 
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span ratio would be 0.5.  Combined with an exponential of  -1.0, the county unloaded rate would 
be multiplied by a factor 2(2 = 0.5-1) which offsets the impact of lower expected yield on the 
premium, maintaining a constant premium per acre.
An exponential less than –1.0 produces a premium per acre that is higher for producers 
with lower expected yields.  If we multiply the example above with an exponential of –1.5, it 
would multiply the county unloaded rate by a factor of 2.8(2.8 = 0.5-1.5).  This will create higher 
loss cost for producers with lower yields (M&R).      
The exponents of –1.0, -1.2 and –1.5 represent the slope of the curve graphing the base 
rate % as a percent of liability against the yield span ratio.  The yield span ratio is Ry = Yi /Yc, 
where Yi is the APH yield for the insured unit and Yc is the RMA (formerly FCIC but now Risk 
Management Agency) established mean yield for the production practice in the country.  An 
illustration of the curve graphing the yield spans with the base rate is given in figure 1.  The base 
rate differential is steep at the lower yield spans, but becomes much more flat at higher yield 
spans.  Also, for higher absolute values of exponential, the rate differential is steeper.  The unit 
division factor is usually equal to 0.9.  It is an incentive offered to the farmers for insuring as a 
basic unit rather than as an optional unit.  CF() is the coverage factor which adjusts for different 
coverage levels of the insured units.  If the coverage level of the insured unit is 75%, the 
coverage factor is 1.0.  If the coverage level of the insured unit is 65%, the coverage factor is 
0.65.  If the coverage level is 50%, the coverage factor is 0.47.  Reserve factor is a measure of 
the systemic risk that cannot be eliminated through pooling.  It is a multiplicative load factor of 
0.88.
DATA AND ANALYSIS
The APHP liability is the product of APH yield, coverage level, price election and 
acreage.  The APHP indemnity is equal to zero if the realized yield is greater than or equal to the 
insured yield.   If the realized yield is less than the insured yield, then the indemnity is equal to 
the shortfall times acreage and price election.  The loss ratio is a ratio of indemnity to the total 
premium of the unit.  It is a measure of the unit-level losses in my analysis.  
The loss ratio may be used as a measure of the effectiveness of corrections made to the 
rate structure, such as those for mean yield discussed by Skees and Reed and Goodwin and for 
optional unit subdivision as examined by Knight and Coble (1999).  It measures whether the 
corrections made are consistent with differences in loss experience.  
Coverage levels from 35% to 75% of the APH yield were offered during the study period.  
More than 95% of the liability insured under the APHP is under the two coverage levels, 65% 
and 75%.   In my analysis, I represent coverage level as a dummy variable that equals zero when 
the unit is insured at 65% and equals one when the unit is insured at 75%.  If the coverage level 
of the insured was not equal to either of these, I eliminated them from the analysis.
Actual Production History yields and indemnity records from 1992 through 1996 were 
obtained from the FCIC.  County yields were obtained from National Agricultural Statistical 
Service.  County dummy variables were incorporated for the counties defined, to capture the 
variability of riskness across counties.  Year dummy variables were incorporated to explain the 
effects of year-specific program factors that might affect the loss.  The other variables that are 
included are optional, 75% coverage level, % irrigated, yield span ratio, 35% penalty, 20% 
penalty, 10% penalty, yield ratio, ownership share, acreage.  These variables are defined in 
Table 1.  
Seventy five percent coverage level is a dummy variable that equals 1 when insured at 
75% and 0 if insured at 65%.  Percent irrigated is the percentage of liability that is on irrigated 
acreage.  Yield span ratio is the ratio of the yield of unit to the estimated county yield.  35% 
penalty is the dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a 35% penalty on t-yields was applied to APH 
calculation due to provision of no actual yields in years 1994-96.  20% penalty is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a 20% penalty was applied to APH calculation due to provision of a year of 
actual yield in years 1994-96.  10% penalty is a penalty on t-yields applied in the APH 
calculation due to provision of only 2 years of actual yields in years 1994-96.  Yield ratio is the 
ratio of actual to predicted county yield in the year.  It is included in the model to account for 
general production conditions in each year, at the county level.  Ownership share is the 
percentage share of the crop that is owned by the insured.  This is included in the model to reflect 
the differences in loss-reporting incentives for owners of a large interest in production from a 
unit versus those whose ownership interest is small.  Acreage is the total acres in the insured 
unit.  This variable is included to account for the differences in losses that may occur due to size 
differences among insured units.  Optional is included to account for the difference in loss ratios 
due to optional subdivision.  A 10% discount is offered for the units that are not optionally 
subdivided.  Yield span ratio is incorporated to examine the appropriateness of the yield span 
ratio adjustment as represented in figure 1.
DATA
Wheat insurance data for the period 1992-96 are used in my analysis.  The states on 
which the modeling was done were Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma, Missouri, 
Washington, Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, Kansas, and North Dakota.  The number of 
observations and the mean values of the variables are given in Table 2.  The number of 
observations range from 16,000 for Washington to 513,000 for North Dakota.  Average insured 
acreage varies from 44.5 in Missouri to 133 acres in Texas.  The average size of an insured unit 
is higher for Washington (321 acres).  The percentage of units insured at coverage level of 75% 
ranges from 1% for Colorado, South Dakota and Texas to a very high 84% for Washington.  
Averages for the ownership share was between 50% for Washington to 82% for Minnesota.  
Means of yield span ratio ranged from 0.83 for Washington to 1.48 for Texas.  The 35% penalty
is applied to 5% of insured units in Kansas and North Dakota to 14% of the insured units in 
Missouri.  The 20% penalty is applicable to 4% in Colorado, Minnesota, Washington and North 
Dakota up to 10% in Missouri. The 10% penalty was imposed on less than 7% of insured units in 
all states.  The values were 4% for Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, Washington, Kansas and 
North Dakota.  The 10% penalty was applicable to 6% of the farmers in Nebraska and Texas and 
7% of the farmers insured in Missouri and Oklahoma.  Yield ratio, which takes a value of 1 when 
the realized county yield is equal to predicted county yield for the year, took values in 0.9’s for 
most of the states except Oklahoma (0.84).  Its’ high was 1.19 for Montana, indicating a very 
favorable production year.  
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
The estimation method used is a Tobit procedure.  The left-hand side variable, loss ratio, 
is left censored at zero.  A zero value is obtained when there is no indemnity and since it was left 
censored, there were no values below that.  Loss ratios up to five or six have been observed.  
Tobit modeling is generally used when there is an activity observed if a variable attains a value 
beyond certain threshold level.  According to Kennedy, “ Tobit contains elements of regression 
(Here the regression of loss ratios that occur when the indemnity is above a certain limit) and 
probit (the chance of indemnity being above a certain level)”.  
Tobit modeling is generally used when the dependent variable is censored.  The general 
formulation of the tobit is usually given by an index function (Greene, 1993) as follows;
Yi
* = ’Xi + i
Yi = 0 if Yi
*  0,
Yi = YI
* if Yi
* > 0.   
For an observation randomly drawn from the population, 
The right-hand side variables include county dummy variables, numbering one less than 
the number of counties in the state. Other dummy variables are year dummies for crop years 
between 1993 and 1996, 35% penalty, 20% penalty, 10% penalty and 75% coverage level.  The 
other variables are yield span ratio, yield ratio, ownership share and acreage. 
The equation is as follows:
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where LRit is the loss ratio for insured unit i in time t; countyci is the vector of dummy variables 
for C-1 of the C counties in the state.  If a county had less than 50 observations, it was 
eliminated.   Yearit is the dummy variable vector depicting the years 1993-96.  The rest of the 
dummy variables and the continuous variables are consistent with earlier definitions.  Finally, 
is the intercept term and it is a random disturbance.
RESULTS
My objective is to examine whether the corrections made to the premium rates 
adequately reflect differences in the loss ratios among insured units.  Table 3 gives the parameter 
estimates and significance of the variables included in the models.  Examining these results , we 
observe that the  75% coverage level variable is not statistically significant at the 10% level in 
seven states.  This means that the rate differencial for the coverage of 75% and 65% are adequate 
for the seven states.  Parameter estimates are positive and significant for Montana, Nebraska, 
Kansas and North Dakota.  This means that, in these states, units insured at the 75% coverage 
level have higher loss ratios than those insured at the  65% coverage level. The rates in these 
states are too low for 75% coverage level compared to 65% coverage level.  
Results for irrigated versus dryland production are very mixed.  The rate differential for 
irrigated units results in a loss ratio that is not significantly different than that for dryland units in 
only three of eleven states.  Among the other states, irrigated units have higher loss ratios in 
Montana, Nebraska and North Dakota and lower loss ratios in Colorado, Minnesota, Oklahoma, 
Washington, Texas and Kansas.  These mixed results support the conclusion that the corrections 
for irrigated versus dryland production are generally inadequate, offering only state-specific 
guidelines as to the nature of the inadequacy.  This suggests a need for additional analysis to 
further explore underlying relationships which give rise to difference in riskiness of irrigated and 
dryland production.
Optional is not significant for seven out of the eleven states.  The states in which optional
is significant are Minnesota, South Dakota, Texas and Kansas.  In all these states except one, 
Minnesota, the sign on the significant parameter estimate is positive.  In general, this supports 
the conclusion that a null hypothesis that the current 10% differential for optional subdivision is 
appropriate cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance in majority of the states.  
Estimated loss ratios are higher for optional than the basic units in three states:  South Dakota, 
Texas and Kansas.  These results suggest that the surcharge of 10% for optional subdivision 
imposed in 1988 is considered generally appropriate, but is inadequate to correct for higher 
losses in three states.
The corrections applied for yield span ratio are adequate for only three states.  This 
means that the risk across each yield span is not correctly captured by the premium rate structure 
of the APHP.  The parameter estimates are positive and significant for seven states.  This finding 
of higher loss ratios for units having higher yield span ratiosindicate that the premium rate 
discounts offered for units with higher yield span ratios are too large. Refering to Figure 1, my 
results indicate that the current yield span exponential for wheat of –1.5 results in rates that 
decline too steeply with yield span rates.  This is an important result which supports results 
obtaind by Knight and Coble which indicated a need for corrections to the central element of the 
APHP rate structure.
Parameter estimates of the penalty imposed, for not providing any actual yield history, 
35%penalty, were negative and significant for nine states.  This means that the penalty imposed 
was too large for producers in Minnesota.  The variable was not significant in Minnesota and 
was positive and significant in Montana.
Parameter estimates for the penalty imposed for providing only one year of actual yield 
history, 20% penalty, were negative and significant for 9 states.  Here the implication is same as 
above: loss ratios do not warrant premium penaltiesas large as currently imposed.
Parameter estimates of the penalty imposed for providing only two years of actual yield 
history, 10% penalty, was not significant for six states and negative and significant for the rest.  
This is a very mixed result.  It means that the 10% penalty was adequate for six states and was 
too much for five states.
Reported acres is positive and significant for nine states.  This means that higher loss 
ratios are obtained for larger units.  This is counter-intuitive to the expectation that larger units 
are composed of more heterogeneous soils and will have less highly-correlated yields than small 
units.  A possible explaination may be that the higher the acreage, higher will be the incentive for 
reporting a loss.
Ownership share is positive and significant in 10 states.  This means that the larger the 
share that an individual holds in an insured unit, the larger will be his loss ratio.  This is intutive, 
because large ownership share provides greater incentive to incur the cash and oppurtunity costs 
of time and effort to report and validate a loss.
Yield ratio is negative and significant in nine out of the eleven states analysed.  This 
means that the loss ratio in a county would be higher in a year where the county yield is higher 
than the normal and vice-versa.  The inclusion of this variable is justfied because it is the best 
available measure of production conditions of the county in that year.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING STATEMENTS
My results show that the various loads imposed in the premium rate structure is adequate 
only for optional subdivision and 75% coverage level.  This is an important result especially 
because I find that yield span ratio, which is in the base rate calculation is not correctly capturing 
the risk differencial between the different yield spans.  The penalties imposed for not providing 
three years of yield history are found to be generally higher than warranted.  Ownership share
and acreage indicate that higher the acreage or ownership share, the higher the incentive for 
reporting a loss.
Since the beginning of the crop insurance program, the FCIC has been trying to reduce 
the losses they incur.  My analysis examined a part of the puzzle, i.e., whether premium 
adjustments correctly account for differences in loss experience among individual insureds.  The 
results are important because it poses the challenge for further analysis into why some 
adjustments are not well calibrated.  With the availabilty of so much data from the RMA(former 
FCIC), one could estimate similar procedure for other crops as corn, sorghum, soybeans, cotton 
and tobacco.   
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Table 1: Number of Significant and Non-Significant Variables in the Models of Wheat 
Loss Ratios
STATE POSITIVE & 
SIGNIFICANT
NEGATIVE & 
SIGNIFICANT
NON-SIGNIFICANT
COLORADO 2 4 4
MISSOURI 3 4 3
MINNESOTA 3 3 4
MONTANA 5 1 4
OKLAHOMA 2 4 4
WASHINGTON 3 4 3
NEBRASKA 4 3 3
SOUTH DAKOTA 4 4 2
TEXAS 4 4 2
NORTH DAKOTA 3 4 3
KANSAS 4 6 0
Table 2: Number of Observations and Means of Variables Included in Models of Wheat Loss Ratios
VARIABLE/
STATISTIC
CO MO MN OK MT WA NE SD TX KS ND
Number 
Obs(1000's)
46 20 77 125 77 16 140 88 69 503 513
75%Coverage 
Level
0.01 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.39 0.84 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.09
Irrigated 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.39 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.29 0.03 0.00
Optional 
Dummy
0.68 0.27 0.77 0.64 0.74 0.36 0.53 0.71 0.49 0.53 0.82
Yield span 
ratio
0.99 1.02 1.10 1.20 1.03 0.83 1.00 0.87 1.48 1.05 0.92
35% Penalty 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05
20% Penalty 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04
10% Penalty 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04
Reported 
Acres
129 44.5 109 110 170 321 69.0 101 133 82 111
Ownership 
Share
0.65 0.68 0.82 0.67 0.70 0.50 0.64 0.75 0.64 0.59 0.73
Yield Ratio 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.84 1.19 1.03 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.05
Table 3: Parameter Estimates and Significance of the Variables included in the Wheat Loss Ratio Models
Variable/
Statistic
CO MO MN OK MT WA NE SD TX KS ND
75% 
Coverage
0.5680 -0.3762 -0.1184 0.5680 1.1284* -0.3762 0.7305* -0.0555 -0.1842 1.0093* 1.6855*
Irrigated -0.4796* -2.6301 -4.4895* -0.4796* 3.4746* -2.6301 1.8263* 0.3949 -3.0021* -0.5697* 5.6359*
Optional
Dummy
0.0790 -0.2215 -0.4680* 0.07900 -0.2161 -0.2215 -0.1377 0.1835* 0.2251* 0.08567* 0.0966
Yield Span
Ratio
0.8356 1.769* 3.6580* 0.8356 0.3084* 1.7686* 1.7209* 2.0913 0.6171* 1.4628* -4.525*
35% Penalty -0.1927* -0.9863* 0.01162 -0.1927* 0.4240* -0.9863* -1.1317* -1.5170* -0.6834* -1.5127* -1.0751*
20% Penalty -0.6229* -1.2167* -0.1706 -0.6229* 0.3398 -1.2167* -0.7990* -0.9613* -0.4944* -1.2478* -1.2345*
10% Penalty -0.3669 -0.5787* 0.0037 -0.3669 -0.0153 -0.5787* -0.3786* -0.4883* -0.1114 -0.4646* -0.1978
Reported 
Acres
0.0014* 0.0029* 0.0023* 0.0014* 0.0008* 0.0029* 0.0003 0.0013* 0.0020* -0.0013* -0.0003
Ownership
Share
0.5227 1.4912* 0.4302* 0.5227* 0.9410* 1.4912* 0.9489* 0.8509* 1.0296* 1.0681* 1.2858*
Yield Ratio -12.178 -14.835 -10.486* -12.176* -14.736* -14.831* -21.515* -16.627* -5.7408* -21.6707* -28.586*
* An asterisk represents the significance of the parameter estimate at 10% level.
Table 4:Definition of Variables included in Models of Loss Ratios
Variable Definition                           
75% Coverage level Dummy variable Equal to 1 if the unit is insured at 75% level and 
0 if insured at 65% level
% Irrigated Continuous variable indicating % of liability in the insured unit that 
is on the irrigated acreage
Optional Dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the unit is insured as an optional unit 
and 0 if insured as a basic unit
Yield Span Ratio Continuous variable equal to the ratio of the unit APH yield to the 
estimated county yield for the year
35% Penalty Dummy variable equal to 1 if a 35% penalty on t-yields was applied 
in the APH calculation due to provision of no actual yields in years 
1994-96
20% Penalty Dummy variable equal to 1 if a 20% penalty on t-yields was applied 
in the APH calculation due to provision of only 1-year of actual 
yields in years 1994-96
10% Penalty Dummy variable equal to 1 if a 10% penalty on t-yields was applied 
in the APH calculation due to provision of only 2-years of actual 
yields in years 1994-96
Reported Acres Total Acreage in the insured unit
Ownership Share Percentage share of crop on the unit that is owned by the insured
Yield Ratio Ratio of actual to predicted county yield in the year
Price Election Price at which any insured yield loss is indemnified. During the 
study period, price elections from 50% to 100% of an estimated 
harvest-period price were available to the insureds.
T-yields are proxy yields used in the APH yield calculation when actual yields for the insured unit are not available.  Prior to 1994, the APH 
yield was the simple average of 10 years of actual and/or t-yields.  In years 1994-96, a simple average of actual yields was used for insureds 
who provided at least four years of history.  APH yields for insureds who provided less than four years of actual yields were augmented with t-
yields to complete a four-year series, with penalties applied to the t-yields if fewer than three years of actual yields were provided.
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Appendix
Table 1: Significant Typing of Variables Included in Models of Loss Ratios
VARIABLE
POSITIVE AND 
SIGNIFICANT
NEGATIVE AND 
SIGNIFICANT NON SIGNIFICANT
75% Coverage level 4 0 7
% Irrigated 3 5 3
Optional Dummy 3 1 7
Yield span ratio 7 1 3
35% Penalty 1 9 1
20% Penalty 0 9 2
10% Penalty 0 5 6
Reported Acres 8 1 2
Ownership Share 10 0 1
Yield Ratio 0 9 2
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Figure 1: APH program base premium rates(stated as percent of liability insured) based on 
yield span ratios
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50
Yield Span Ratio
B
as
e 
R
at
e 
%
-1
-1.5
-2
E=-2
E=-1.5
E=-1
